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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the summer of 2005, Dutch law did not offer an appropriate means for
1
dealing with mass claims efficiently and effectively. The multitude of parties
and their individual circumstances created too much complexity for Dutch
2
procedural law to deal with mass damages cases effectively. In July 2005, a new
3
mechanism for dealing with mass damages came into force. This mechanism is
based on the Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade (“WCAM”), an act on
4
collective settlement of mass damages.
5
The WCAM offers a means for the settlement of mass damages. The
application of WCAM is based upon an agreement, which provides for the

* Bart Krans is professor of private law at University of Groningen.
1. See generally Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands,
ROTTERDAM INSTITUTE OF PRIVATE LAW 171, 173-78 (Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009).
2. Id. at 176-77.
3. Van Boom, supra note 1, 177-78; see generally H.B. Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 C.J.Q. (2012), 141; see
generally D. Ozmis & I.N. Tzankova, De Evaluatie van de WCAM: de Kernthema’s Uitgelicht, TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR CIVIELE RECHTSPLEGING 33, 33 (2012) (Neth.).
4. See generally Van Boom, supra note 1; see generally Ozmis & Tzankova, supra note 3.
5. The WCAM has been the subject of a number of publications. See, e.g., Van Boom, supra note 1, at
171; see, e.g., Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities
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6

settlement of mass damages claims. This agreement must be concluded between
organizations that represent victims and the parties who will provide
7
compensation. Once an agreement is achieved, parties can apply jointly to the
court to declare the agreement binding upon all persons who suffer damage as a
8
result of the event or events referred to in the contract. If the court grants the
application, the agreement is binding on the entire group of victims referred to in
9
the contract. The proceedings before the court therefore do not primarily concern
the relationship between the contracting parties, but rather they concern the
10
settlement agreement and its consequences for the victims. The court of appeal
11
in Amsterdam is competent to decide on the application.
Since the enactment of this WCAM, seven applications have been brought to
12
the court. The application to declare the contract generally binding was granted
13
in six of these cases. In July 2013, several amendments to the WCAM came into
14
force. Two main amendments were made to the WCAM: the option of a pretrial

Claim Settlement from the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010). Regarding publications in Dutch
I will limit myself to refer to Ozmis & Tzankova, supra note 3, at 33-42, D.F. Lunsingh Scheurleer, Collectief
Schikken met de wet Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade’, in IN DE SCHADUW VAN HET SLACHTOFFER 4958 (C.J.M. Klaassen ed., 2013). H.B. Krans, Een Nieuwe Aanpak van Massaschade, 2005/2 NTBR 2.
6. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 178; Krans, supra note 3, at 142.
7. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW], art. 7:907 (Neth.); see Krans, supra note 3, at 142; see Van Boom, supra
note 1, at 178. Insurance companies can also act as parties to the contract.
8. Krans supra note 3, at 142; Van Boom, supra note 1 at 179.
9. Krans supra note 3, at 142; Van Boom, supra note 1 at 179; BW, art. 7:907 (Neth.).
10. Once the settlement agreement is declared generally binding these victims referred to in the contract
are considered as parties to the settlement agreement. BW art. 7:908 (Neth.); see infra Part VIII.
11. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv], art. 1013, para 3 (Neth.); Van Boom, supra note 1, at
181-82; Krans, supra, note 3, at 142.
12. Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt. [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:AX6440] (Foundation
Centre DES et al.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Foundation Centre DES]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR 2007,
71 m.nt. AFJA Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ7033] (Dexia Bank Nederland NV/Foundation Platform
Aandelenlease) (Neth.) [hereinafter Dexia Bank]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA
Leijten [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI5744] (Shell Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.)
[hereinafter Shell Petroleum NV]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 m.nt. AFJA Leijten
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2717] (Foundation Vie D’Or) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie D’Or]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 15
juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. ACW Pijls [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:BJ2691] (Randstad Holding) (Neth.)
[hereinafter Ranstad Holding]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. JS Kortmann
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908] (Scor Holding/Interim Decision) (Neth.) [hereinafter Scor Holding/Interim
Decision]; Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong [ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:
BV1026] (Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Scor Holding]. In the seventh case there is an Interim Decision
(Hof Amsterdam 12 november 2013, JOR 2013, 343 m.nt. AFJA Leijten (Schimmelpenninnck and Knüppe q.q.
et al./X et al.; interimdecision)), but there is not final decision yet.
13. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note
12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12; Randstad Holding, supra note 12; Scor Holding/Interim Decision, supra note 12;
Scor Holding, supra note 12.
14. Stb. 2013, P. 256.
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hearing was introduced and the scope of the WCAM was extended to apply to
16
bankruptcy cases.
As a consequence of the Dexia case, in July 2013, one of the aforementioned
technical changes to the WCAM concerned a clarification of the scope of the
17
WCAM. According to the wording of the WCAM the agreement must seek
18
compensation for damages. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the
amending Act, the Dexia case demonstrated that claims in the case of mass
19
damages do not have to be claims for compensation. Many claims in the Dexia
20
case concerned the validity of contracts and the remission of debts to the bank.
This contribution will explore the system under the WCAM, some aspects of
case law, and some elements of WCAM’s July 2013 amendment.
II. REASON FOR AND SCOPE OF THE WCAM
Before the WCAM came into force, Dutch law did not offer the courts an
21
adequate toolkit for dealing with mass damages. There were several options, but
22
each of them had serious disadvantages. For example, Dutch law does not
recognize class actions to allow parties to ask for compensation in a collective
23
action. A foundation or an association that meets certain requirements can
institute an action intended to promote the similar interests of other persons, but
24
the object of this right of action cannot be to seek monetary compensation.
When designing the WCAM, the legislator considered whether this restriction
25
should be abolished, but decided not to make that change. Opening up the
possibility of seeking monetary compensation in a class action would make a
26
procedure with a large number of claimants “unmanageable.” Settlement of

15. See infra Part IV.
16. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the amendment to the WCAM, the Minister refers in this respect
to the bankruptcy of the DSB Bank (a Dutch bank which was declared bankrupt in 2009). The validation of
individual bank creditors’ claims can be an administrative burden, so stated the Minister. The WCAM
procedure could be an appropriate procedure in mass claims to replace this costly and time-consuming
validation procedure. See MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 10-11. This new option for the application of the
WCAM in bankruptcy cases will be excluded from this article.
17. See id. at 17.
18. See, e.g., BW art. 7:907 para. 1 (Neth.).
19. Id. at 29.
20. The WCAM can also be applied to agreements that provide aggrieved persons with other rights than
compensation. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.).
21. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 173-78 (discussing the history of the different Acts passed before the
WCAM).
22. See generally id.
23. See id.
24. BW art. 3:305(a)(1) (Neth.).
25. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, part 2, pp. 2-3.
26. Id. at 8-9.
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mass damages claims through the WCAM would be more profitable, the Minister
27
of Justice stated.
28
The direct cause for the WCAM was the DES Case. This case concerned a
29
defective pharmaceutical that was intended for use during pregnancy. It
transpired when this pharmaceutical caused severe physical injuries to the
30
daughters of women who took the medicine. These women turned to the
pharmaceutical’s manufacturers, but they were initially confronted with a
difficulty in establishing causation, i.e. proving which manufacturer had
31
produced the pills their mothers had taken long ago. The case was taken to the
Dutch Supreme Court on the issue of causation, which the court found in the
32
claimants’ favor. However, this case was not yet over. After several more years,
the DES-fund turned to the Dutch Ministry of Justice and requested its
33
cooperation in finding a solution for this case. The Ministry of Justice,
responsible for the lion’s share of civil legislation in the Netherlands, decided to
34
draw up an act, but wanted to avoid ad hoc legislation. The scope of the new act
35
36
had to be broader than just one case. The WCAM was the result.
It is interesting to note the type of cases to which the WCAM has been
37
applied so far. The WCAM does not define mass damages. The settlement
agreement must concern compensation of damages “caused by an event or
38
similar events.” With respect to the type of cases to which the WCAM could be
applied, the Minister of Justice mentioned examples during the design phase,
such as the disaster at an exploding fireworks factory in Enschede (a town in the

27. Id. at 5. During the parliamentary debate on the July 2013 amendments it was also argued that the
prohibition to seek monetary compensation in a class action should be abolished. In its reaction the Minister of
Justice discussed options for a collective action seeking monetary compensation, but did not propose the
abolishment of the prohibition to seek monetary compensation in a class action. See generally Letter Minister
Justice, TK 2011-12, 33 126, no. 6.
28. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see P.N. van Regteren Altena, De Collectieve Afwikkeling van
de Des-zaak in Nederland, in HET WETSVOORSTEL COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN MASSASCHADE 27 (A.I.M.
van Mierlo et al. eds., 2005).
29. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12, at 4.
30. Id.
31. Lucas Bergkamp, Compensating Personal Injuries Caused by DES: “No Causation Liability” in the
Netherlands, 1 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 35, 35 (1994).
32. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
33. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, p. 1.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, the Minister of Justice referred to the American
class action (Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and stated that the vast majority of the “mass tort
class actions” do not lead to a final judgment, but end with a settlement. He also stated that American practices
also demonstrate that parties often reach a settlement and that afterwards a fresh damages class action is started
to have the settlement declared generally binding. That outcome to the settlement of mass damages actions is
comparable to the WCAM, stated the Minister. Id. at 4.
37. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.).
38. Id.
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Netherlands), a fire that broke out in a crowded cafe in Volendam (also a town in
39
the Netherlands), and the DES case on defective medication. When studying the
WCAM and its parliamentary documentation, it is easy to gain the impression
that the WCAM’s design focus was on personal injury cases. However, out of the
40
six cases dealt with under the WCAM, only one dealt with personal injury. The
41
other five cases have concerned purely financial matters.
III. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The court application to declare a settlement agreement binding is not merely
a formality. According to the WCAM, the court must consider many aspects
42
when deciding if the settlement agreement is binding. Many of these elements
concern the settlement agreement.
This collective settlement is an agreement concerning the payment of
43
compensation for damages caused by “an event or similar events.” The
settlement agreement must include a description of the group or groups of
44
persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded. The idea is that the
45
settlement agreement uses damage scheduling. The injured persons are divided
46
into groups based on several factors. The amount of compensation they are
47
entitled to depends on their group classification. The advantage of this damage
scheduling is that there is no need to identify all the victim’s individual
circumstances relating to their damages: causation, exact amount of damages,
48
49
contributory negligence, etc. It is clear that this system promotes efficiency.
Since July 2013, the WCAM also makes clear that the settlement agreement must
50
contain a description of the event or events the to which the agreement relates.
The settlement agreement must also contain the most accurate possible
51
indication of the number of persons belonging to the group or groups. This
requirement relates to the fact that the court will deny the request for collective
binding if no sufficient guarantee is provided for the payment of the claims made

39. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, at 18.
40. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
41. Id.; Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12;
Randstad Holding, supra note 12; Scor Holding/Interim Decision, supra note 12; Scor Holding, supra note 12.
42. See BW art. 7:907 (Neth.).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, part 4, pp. 8.
46. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414 no.3, at pp. 11-12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. BW art. 7:907(2)(a) (Neth.).
51. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(c).
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52

under the contract. Several elements must be mentioned in the contract, such as
53
the conditions for applying for compensation under the contract and details of
54
the address to opt out. The agreement must, inter alia, also provide an option
for an independent adjudication of disputes that might arise from the contract by
55
someone other than the court which has jurisdiction according to the law.
The amount of compensation awarded to the victims is sometimes referred to
56
as the heart of the settlement agreement. According to the WCAM, the court
will reject an application to declare an agreement generally binding if it considers
the compensation awarded unfair with respect to the amount of damages, the
simplicity and speed with which the compensation can be obtained, and the
57
available causes of the damage.
58
A hardship clause can be part of the settlement agreement. Such a clause
can form the basis of a more individual approach towards victims than is
59
envisaged by the damage scheduling. To a certain extent, it could lead to certain
60
victims within a group being entitled to more compensation than others. The
61
settlement agreement in the DES case did not contain a hardship clause. The
court considered that such a clause could seem appealing because the specific
circumstances of the individual cases could be taken into account when
62
establishing the amount of compensation. However, the court went on to say,
63
there were also reasons for arguing against that approach. A significant number
of the injured parties could argue that their cases were special, which would lead
64
to several negative outcomes. Therefore, the court decided that the contracting
65
parties could in reasonableness omit that clause. Instead, there was a clause in
the DES case settlement agreement providing that victims for whom the burden
of damage would be unreasonably hard despite the agreement’s effect could be
66
more generously compensated. The presence of this clause played a role in the

52. Id. at art. 7:907(3)(c).
53. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(e).
54. Id. at art. 7:907(2)(g).
55. Id. at art. 7:907(3)(d).
56. H.B. Krans, DES en Dexia: de Eerste Ervaringen met Collectieve Afkikkeling van Massaschade, 41
NJB 2598, 2602 (2007).
57. BW art. 7:907(3)(b) (Neth.).
58. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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court’s decision that the amounts of compensation agreed in the contract were not
67
unreasonable.
IV. ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS
The settlement agreement necessary for the WCAM is a voluntary
68
agreement. The WCAM assumes that the parties will reach a collective
69
settlement. Why would parties voluntarily oblige themselves to provide
compensation? The negotiations do not start at gunpoint. There has to be a
70
willingness to negotiate on both sides of the table. Several incentives to settle
71
can be identified for the parties who provide compensation. A few aspects that
72
could promote out-of-court settlement will be considered in this section.
First, the application of the WCAM decreases the chance of a multitude of
73
individual proceedings, perhaps lasting years. Long-lasting individual
74
proceedings carry costs and uncertainty with them. They can also lead to
75
continuing bad publicity. It is obvious that avoiding this is a potential benefit. In
this respect the WCAM offers the option to prevent further damage to
76
reputation. The finality of the settlement agreement with the victims, who are
77
bound by the contract, can be an incentive. This finality can lead to a degree of
78
certainty about the financial obligations towards the victims.
The terminology used in the WCAM is not liable for parties or persons, but
79
parties who commit themselves by this agreement to provide compensation.
This is deliberately done to prevent the parties who committed themselves to pay
80
from directly or indirectly admitting that they are liable. Victims who opt out or
victims to whom the settlement agreement does not refer could use such
81
admission in establishing their individual claims.
The WCAM’s opt-out system can also promote the number of victims who are
ultimately bound by the contract, in the sense that they lose their right to start

67. Id.
68. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 178.
69. MvT, TK 2008-09, 31 76, no. 1, p.7.
70. See Van Boom, supra note 1, at 180.
71. Id.
72. See H.B. Krans, Procesrechtelijke Prikkels en Knelpunten van de WCAM, in RECHT IN REGIO 37-38
(A.L.M. Keirse et al. eds., 2006).
73. See MvT, TK 2008-2009, 31 762, no. 1, p. 6.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 1-2.
78. Id.
79. BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.).
80. See MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 10.
81. See infra Part VIII.
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individual proceedings against the parties that, according to claimants, are liable for
82
their losses. Moreover, if the parties who commit themselves to providing
compensation wish to avoid excessive uncertainty about the number of victims who
83
will opt out, they can make a reservation on that point. The settlement contract
cannot be conditional, except for a condition as to the percentage of victims referred
84
to in the contract who may opt out. If such a condition is part of the contract, the
parties who commit themselves by the agreement to provide compensation are
85
entitled to terminate the contract if the agreement fails to cover enough victims. The
86
agreement in the DES case contained such a condition, while the agreement in the
87
Dexia case did not contain such a condition.
88
A WCAM application must be filed at the court of appeal in Amsterdam. The
legislature deliberately chose a court of appeal instead of a first instance district court
89
as the competent court. A court of appeal decision in WCAM cases is open to
90
cassation, but only by the applicants together. This system means that a WCAM
application will only be brought before the Supreme Court, which rules in cassation,
if the court of appeal denies an application to declare the settlement contract
91
92
generally binding. If the request is granted, cassation is not possible. This system
93
has caused debate among Dutch scholars. The Minister opposed more generous
options for appeal because in a procedure where a large number of interested parties
94
are involved, an option for appeal can cause serious delay for all of them. The
95
Minister gave great weight to the avoidance of delay. Therefore, it is a one-shot
procedure except for cassation. In some ways this is remarkable because it offers
96
interested victims only one chance to articulate their views. However, if victims are
97
not happy with the final result, they retain the option to opt out.
It can easily be argued that the WCAM does not provide sufficient incentive for
98
the parties to settle voluntarily. This is true—there is no formal pressure. So far,
agreements have nonetheless been achieved in the Netherlands. Apparently, both

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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See id.
See id. at 186.
BW art 7:908(4) (Neth.).
See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
See generally Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
RV art. 1013(3) (Neth.).
See id.
Id. at art. 1018(1).
Krans, supra note 56, at 2599-2601.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2601.
MvT, TK 2003-2004, 29 414, no.3, p. 31.
Id. at 15.
Id.
See infra Part VIII.
See generally RV art. 1013 (Neth.).
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sides in these settled cases have recognized the benefits of the WCAM. Nevertheless,
in recent years the Dutch Legislature has considered how to promote out-of-court
99
settlement. An evaluation of the WCAM in 2008 played an important role.
At the time of that evaluation, two cases had been handled under the WCAM
(DES and Dexia) and settlement agreements had already been concluded in other
100
cases. In a letter to Parliament on the evaluation, the Minister of Justice stated
101
that the total value of these cases was just under EUR 1.5 billion. Consultation
with judges, lawyers, interest organizations, and the parties who had caused the
102
damages and were directly involved in these cases were part of the evaluation.
One of the main findings was that the WCAM provides an efficient and effective
method for settling damages collectively, but in the absence of a willingness to
103
negotiate, the Act does not supply a solution. One of the other findings of the
evaluation is that the WCAM is widely applicable, although this was not always
104
reflected properly by the terminology used in the Act. A third finding of the
evaluation concerned the concurrence of individual proceedings and the judicial
105
examination of the application. The Dexia case demonstrated that the legal
rules on suspension required adjustment, for example, to avoid that this
106
concurrence influences the success of the settlement agreement.
Based on the evaluation, the Minister of Justice proposed several additional
107
measures. One of them was a pretrial hearing, which has been part of the
108
WCAM since July 2013. This pretrial hearing offers parties and the court the
109
opportunity to explore whether a collective settlement can be reached. The goal
is, according to the Minister of Justice, to assist parties in the out-of-court
110
negotiations so that they can conclude a settlement agreement. At this hearing,
the court might be able to assist parties in formulating the main point of dispute
and stimulate them to reach a settlement, according to the Explanatory
111
Memorandum. It had already been suggested in the 2008 WCAM evaluation

99. See generally MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3.
100. See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
101. MvT, TK 2008-09, 31 762, no. 1, p. 3.
102. Id. at 5-6.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5-6; see infra Part VII.
107. See generally MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414 no.3
108. See RV art. 1018(a) (Neth.). The other change is that since that date the WCAM is also applicable to
bankruptcy cases. In the explanatory memorandum to the amendment to the WCAM, the Minister refers to the
bankruptcy of the DSB Bank in 2009. The validation of individual bank creditors’ claims can be an
administrative burden. The WCAM procedure could be an appropriate procedure in mass claims to replace this
costly and time-consuming validation procedure. See also MvT, TK 2011-2012, 33 126, no. 3, p. 7.
109. See RV art. 1018(a) (Neth.).
110. MvT, TK 2011-12, 33 126, no. 3, p. 26.
111. Id. at 25.
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that the court could assist the parties in formulating some of the important points
112
for negotiation and encourage them to reach agreement.
In the 2008 evaluation, the Minister also suggested introducing the option for
courts to ask questions directly to the Supreme Court by way of pre-judicial
113
procedure, which was introduced in Dutch law in 2012. The application of the
114
WCAM was an important motive for introducing this pre-judicial procedure.
Being able to seek answers from the highest court on essential legal issues can
have several benefits in mass cases. The Minister of Justice lists several
advantages in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Act on pre-judicial questions
115
116
to the Supreme Court. One is that it can promote out-of-court settlement.
Moreover, if the answer to an important legal question can be taken into account
in the settlement agreement, this can improve the quality of that agreement and
117
enhance its acceptance, and avoid possible later dissatisfaction with its content.
In addition, it might prevent aggrieved parties opting out or initiating individual
118
proceedings. Therefore, although the application of the WCAM played an
important role in introducing the pre-judicial procedure into Dutch law, the scope
of this new procedure was deliberately not limited to WCAM cases. However,
there is a restriction with respect to WCAM cases: the option to ask questions of
the Supreme Court is not available to the court dealing with a WCAM
119
application.
The rationale behind this exclusion is that once the WCAM application for
collective binding effect is filed, the court has to decide whether the settlement
agreement is fair. This settlement agreement could very well have been
concluded, despite some of the legal issues relevant to it not having been settled
120
definitively. Therefore, the Minister stated that asking questions of the
Supreme Court at that stage could disturb the balance of a settlement
121
agreement.
Considering the introduction of the pre-judicial procedure and the pretrial
hearing, the Dutch legislator can be regarded as having chosen to increase the
role of the courts in WCAM proceedings. Considering the aforementioned
possible advantages of these new mechanisms, this would appear be a good thing
because it could promote the conclusion of settlement agreements and therefore
decrease the chances of multiple individual proceedings.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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MvT, TK 2008-09, 21 762, no. 1, p. 6.
Id.
See RV art. 392-94 (Neth.).
MvT, TK 2010-11, 32 612, no.3 p.6.
See id.; see also RV art. 392 (Neth.).
MvT, TK 2010-11, 32 612, no.3 p.6.; see also RV art. 392(3)-(4) (Neth.).
See MvT, TK 2010- 11, 32 612, no. 3, pp. 3-4.
Id. at 7; see also RV art. 392(1) (Neth.).
See MvT, TK 2010-2011, 32 612, no. 3, p. 6.
Id.
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V. CONTRACTING PARTIES
As far as the “paying side” is concerned, one or more parties who commit
themselves by this agreement to pay compensation conclude the settlement
122
contract. The Legislature has, as stated, chosen not to use the word ‘liable’ in
123
the WCAM. Therefore, it can remain undecided whether the parties who
124
provide compensation are in fact liable. Insurance companies can also be
125
contracting parties. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister of Justice
remarked that insurance companies can take the initiative for negotiations on a
126
settlement agreement.
Parties on the other side have to be victim representative organizations:
foundations or associations with full legal competence, which must represent the
127
interests of the victims according to their statutes. In addition, the court must
deny a request for collective binding effect if the organization is not sufficiently
representative of the interests of the persons on whose behalf the agreement is
128
concluded. Practice has shown that the settlement agreements in several cases
129
were concluded by more than one foundation or association.
Accordingly, the Court has to rule on the requirement of
130
representativeness. In the DES case, it was argued that a representative
organization (Stichting Des-centrum) was not sufficiently representative because
(to put it briefly) it was not clear whether the outcome of the negotiations was
131
sufficiently satisfactory for the victims. The court ruled that it was possible for
the outcome of negotiations to be less than some people hoped for or expected,
but this would not stand on its own as a sufficiently concrete indication that a
132
significant group of victims rejects the outcome of negotiations. In that sense,
there was no reason to consider the Stichting Des-centrum insufficiently
133
representative of the victims’ interests.
122. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 179.
123. See generally id.
124. See generally id.
125. See MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, part 3, pp. 10-11.
126. Id.
127. BW art. 7:907(1)(c) (Neth.).
128. BW art. 7:907(3)(f) (Neth.).
129. This was also expressed in the parliamentary documents leading to the amendment of the WCAM in
July 2013. See MvT, TK 2012-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 14. Accordingly, this amendment clarified in the wording of
the Act that the agreement can be concluded by one or more associations or foundations representing the
interests of the victims. See MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 14.
130. The aforementioned July 2013 amendment of the WCAM also tightened the requirements on
representativeness for a foundation or an association to start a collective action by changing BW art. 3:305(a)(2)
(Neth.). This representativeness requirement for collective actions has since then been the equivalent of the
same requirement in the WCAM. MvT, TK 2012-2013, 33 126, no. 3, p. 10.
131. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
132. Id.
133. See Krans, supra note 56, at 2600-01.
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In Dexia, the court of appeal in Amsterdam ruled that it was not necessary
for each of the four applicants to represent the entire group of victims, as long as
each of them was sufficiently representative of a sufficiently significant group of
134
these people.
VI. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT
Once an agreement is concluded, the contracting parties can ask the court to
135
declare the settlement generally binding. The request must be done jointly by
136
the contracting parties. Therefore, from that point on, these parties have a
137
common goal: the general binding effect of the settlement agreement. This, of
course, does not mean that only the voice of the contracting parties can be heard
138
in court. Before ruling on the application, the court must call the persons on
139
whose behalf the agreement is concluded, as far as they are known. They are,
of course, not obliged to come to the court, but they must have the opportunity to
140
141
appear. They are also entitled to file a statement of opposition.
The court must consider many aspects, especially of the settlement contract,
when deciding to grant or to deny the application. Given the consequences of a
142
positive court decision, such careful deliberation is fully justified.
One of the grounds for the court to deny the application is if the settlement
agreement does not contain all the prescribed elements: damage scheduling, an
accurate indication of the number of victims per group, the amount of
compensation awarded, the conditions that must be met by the victims, the name
143
or address for an opt-out declaration, etc.
Perhaps the most important element is the amount of compensation
144
awarded. If this amount is not reasonable, the Act requires the court to deny the
145
application. The WCAM prescribes that when deciding the amount of
compensation, the court must consider the simplicity and the speed at which the
146
compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the damage. The court

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.).
Id.
See id.
See RV art. 1013(5) (Neth.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see generally BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.).
See BW art. 7:907(2) (Neth.).
See id. at art. 7:907(3)(b); see Krans, supra note 56, at 2602.
Id.
Id.
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has considered this point in its rulings in all of the cases decided so far, and fairly
147
comprehensively in several other cases.
In the Dexia case, for example, some of the aggrieved persons referred to in
the contract who presented their views on the request in the WCAM proceedings
stated that the agreed amounts of compensation did not sufficiently reflect the
148
damage suffered. The court considered, after having investigated the structure
of the agreements and the agreed amounts, that the settlement agreement was the
outcome of negotiations undertaken in a context of insecurity, where concessions
149
were made by both sides and risks were estimated. The mere fact that the
agreement did not provide for full compensation, or the higher amount that the
complainants preferred, could not give rise to the conclusion that the agreed
150
amounts were not fair. The court also extensively explored the criticism leveled
151
at Dexia for the damage. Having established this criticism, the court ruled that
152
the agreed amounts were sufficient in the context of these criticisms. The
arguments presented by the claimants that the agreed amounts were not high
153
enough were ultimately rejected.
Deciding on the fairness of the agreed amount can be an especially difficult
task for the court given that the WCAM procedure is special in the sense that the
154
court can only rule on a joint application. The contracting parties must bring
155
the application together. This means that once the settlement agreement is
concluded, the contracting parties, who previously negotiated the settlement, gain
a common goal: securing a declaration from the court that the contract is binding
upon all the persons referred to in the contract. The result of this procedure is
156
that, once they turn to the courts, their interests are common. However, the
court must decide the application on the basis of the interests of all the victims

147. See, e.g., Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see, e.g., Vie D’Or, supra note 12; see, e.g., Shell Petroleum
NV, supra note 12; see, e.g., Randstad Holding, supra note 12; see, e.g., Scor Holding, supra note 12.
148. Dexia Bank, supra note 12.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Among Dutch scholars there seems to be no consensus on the nature of this assessment by the
court. It is stated that the assessment of the fairness of the compensation in the agreement is extensive. B.J.
BROEKEMA-ENGELEN, TEKST & COMMENTAAR BURGERLIJK WETBOEK (J.H. Nieuwenhuis et al. eds. 2013);
BW art. 7:907(5) (Neth.). On the other hand it is also remarked that this assessment is more marginal. W.J.J.
LOS, Toepassing van de WCAM Bespiegelingen Over de rol en de Taak van de Rechter, in COLLECTIEVE
ACTIES IN HET ALGEMEEN EN DE WCAM IN HET BIJZONDER par. 6 (2013); A.J. KOK AND M.H.C. SINNIGHE
DAMSTÉ, CONVERIUM: EEN STAP VOORUIT BIJ COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN INTERNATIONALE
MASSASCHADE IN NEDERLAND, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR DE ONDERNEMINGSRECHTPRAKTIJK 34 (2011). For another
recent publication on this topic see CARLA KLAASSEN, DE ROL VAN DE (GEWIJZIGDE) WCAM BIJ DE
COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING VAN MASSASCHADE ‘EN NOG WAT VAN DIE DINGEN’, ARS AEQUI par. 4.1 (2013).
154. See BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.); see also RV art. 1013 (Neth.).
155. See RV art. 1013 (Neth.).
156. See BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.); see also RV art. 1013 (Neth.).
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157

referred to in the contract. Any objections must be brought by those victims,
158
but these victims have no options for appeal or cassation.
If the court feels the need to hear an expert’s opinion, it can order that one or
159
more experts give their opinions on matters relevant to the application. An
160
expert report can, for example, concern the representativeness. The agreed
161
amount of compensation can also be the topic of an expert report. The Dexia
162
case, for example, concerned several types of financial product contracts. One
of the defenses offered was that the bank itself had incurred no or limited losses
on the shares in question because it had not actually bought and held the shares
163
itself. It was therefore argued that it was not reasonable for these losses to have
been covered by the bank’s clients (who bought complicated financial products
164
165
from the bank). The Amsterdam court ordered an expert report on that point.
166
The Dutch Authority on Financial Markets (“AFM”) was appointed as expert.
Based on the AFM report, the court ruled that there was insufficient reason to
167
doubt that Dexia had bought and held the shares.
The judicial review of the application and the settlement agreement has to
168
cover other aspects as well. The court must, for example, deny an application if
169
insufficient security is lodged to pay the contractual amounts. The court has
170
explicitly considered this point in several cases so far. The agreement also has
to provide for independent dispute resolution (by another person than the judge
deemed competent according to the law) on issues that may arise from the
171
agreement. In the Shell and the Dexia cases, the Amsterdam court allowed the
settlement agreement to provide that aggrieved parties may choose whether they
wanted to bring a dispute concerning the contract before a disputes committee or
172
before the court. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the recent amendments to

157. Van Boom, supra note 1, at 182.
158. See id. at 186.
159. RV art. 1016 (Neth.).
160. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 29.
161. Id. at 14-15.
162. Dexia Bank, supra note 12.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Van Boom, supra note 1, at 183.
169. Id.
170. See Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see Vie D’Or, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note
12; see Randstad Holding, supra note 12.
171. BW art. 7:907(3)(d) (Neth.). Until the amendment of the WCAM in July 2013, what was required
was an independent determination of the (individual) compensation.
172. Dexia Bank, supra note 12; Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
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the WCAM, the Memorandum reiterated that this was allowed because it is an
173
extension of the dispute resolution options available to victims.
The court must also consider whether the interests of the persons on whose
behalf the agreement was concluded are otherwise insufficiently safeguarded,
and whether that group is large enough to justify the declaration that the
174
agreement is binding.
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, the Minister of Justice
stated that the court, when deciding on the fairness of the agreed amounts, can
take into account that the total property available to the party providing
175
compensation is insufficient to compensate all the victims entirely. It would
appear logical that restrictions to the availability of resources are taken seriously.
The fact that the available amount can be taken into account should improve the
chances that a settlement agreement will be concluded. On the other hand, it
might not be easy to establish the amount available for the execution of the
176
settlement agreement. In its advice on the draft WCAM, the Netherlands
Association for the Judiciary (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtspraak
[“NVvR”]) was critical on this point and stated that the courts might not have
177
insight into the capacity for payment of the party who caused the damage.
The court can order the parties to complete or to adjust the agreement before
178
deciding on its application. In the DES Case, the Amsterdam court ruled that,
as a starting point, this option may only be used if the request for collective
binding effect will be declined on one of the grounds for refusal of art. 7:907
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, such as the reasonableness of the agreed amount
or insufficient security or insufficient representativeness of the contracting
179
foundation or association.
VII. OTHER PROCEDURAL RULES
This section will discuss some procedural aspects of the WCAM. At the
instigation of the Advisory Commission for Civil Procedure Law, the handling of
180
WCAM cases was concentrated at one court. When choosing the court of
appeal in Amsterdam, the Minister stated that would enable WCAM cases to
benefit from the financial expertise of the Enterprise Division
181
(Ondernemingskamer). This Enterprise Division is part of the Amsterdam
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, pp. 10-11.
See BW art. 7:907(3)(e), (g) (Neth.).
MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, pp. 3, 13. See generally Krans, supra note 5, at 7, 8.
Letter from the Scientific Committee to the Mayor, p. 3 (Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with author).
Id.
BW art. 7:907(4) (Neth.).
See generally Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no.3, p. 25.
Id.
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182

Court of Appeal and deals with (to put it in briefly) corporate litigation. This
fits well with mass damages claims related to financial products. The connection
between the expertise of the Enterprise Division and mass damages might be less
obvious when personal injury is involved, but the fact that it may be useful to
have some experience in corporate litigation when handling WCAM cases, with
their multitude of interested persons, cannot be excluded. Thus, concentrating
WCAM cases in a single court is a positive step. Given that five of the six
WCAM cases so far have concerned the field of finance, the rationale for the
choice of the Amsterdam court seems better founded that might have been
expected at the time the WCAM was designed. Although the Legislature’s
motivation for this one court does not explicitly refer to WCAM cases on
financial products and the usefulness of the experience of the Enterprise
Division, choosing this court seems appropriate.
Of course, the application for collective binding effect has to meet several
183
requirements. For example, until July 2013 it was formally required that the
names and addresses of all the victims known to the contracting parties had to be
184
listed on the face of the application. However, the Amsterdam court has
allowed names and addresses to be listed in an appendix. In the Vie d’Or case, a
185
CD-ROM with these facts was allowed. It is now no longer required for the
names of the victims known to the parties to be listed on the face of the
application, but the court can order, on request or ex officio, that the names and
addresses of the victims known to the contracting parties be supplied to the
186
court.
All injured persons referred to in the settlement contract should have the
187
opportunity to be heard on request and must be notified. This notification can
188
be by normal post, unless the court decides otherwise. In the Shell case, the
court allowed that potentially interested persons in the Netherlands, on whose
behalf the agreement was concluded—as far as they were known to the
189
claimants—be notified by normal post. In the Vie d’Or case, the court allowed
that the persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded and who resided
190
in the Netherlands were notified by email. The recent amendment to the
182. See generally ONDERNEMINGSKAMER, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/organisatie/
gerechtshoven/amsterdam/overhetgerechtshof/organisatie/ondernemingskamer/pages/default.aspx#TOCHeadin
gRichHtmlFIeld17.
183. See generally RV art. 1013(1) (Neth.).
184. See generally id.
185. Vie D’Or, supra note 12.
186. See RV art. 1013(6) (Neth.) (stating that it is sufficient to note the last addresses of the victims
known to the contracting parties).
187. See id. at art. 1013(5).
188. Id.
189. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
190. If the requesting parties did not have the email addresses, notification by regular letter was
permitted. Vie D’Or, supra note 12.
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WCAM follows this practice: the court may order the requesting parties to supply
191
names and addresses of known victims, in a manner determined by the court.
192
Practice has demonstrated that websites can play a role regarding notification.
In addition to the calling of the persons known to the contracting parties,
193
notification must be made in one or more newspapers (appointed by the court).
As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the WCAM, publication is
194
essential because the identity of many interested persons can be unknown. The
court can even decide that notification by regular letter is too great a burden, (if
the number of interested persons involved is high) and order that notification in
195
the press will suffice.
It is quite possible that at the time of the application—thus after agreement
has been reached—several cases on the matter of the settlement agreement will
have already been brought to court on an individual basis. These proceedings
could have been initiated before the negotiations on the matter in question
196
started. Proceedings concerning disputes that the settlement agreement aims to
bring to an end will be suspended once a WCAM application for collective binding
197
effect is filed. Before July 2013, individual proceedings were only suspended on
request, but the recent amendment provided that a procedural action for suspension
198
is unnecessary and a burden for many injured persons. However, if for some
reason the parties would prefer to continue the individual proceedings, that is, of
199
course, a valid ground for resumption.
As stated in Part IV, according to the Explanatory Memorandum to the recent
amendments to the WCAM, the Dexia case has demonstrated that proceedings that
were resumed during the opt-out term have led to case law that could influence
200
other people’s decisions on whether to opt-out. Therefore, since July 2013,
201
individual proceedings cannot be resumed until the opt-out term has elapsed. The
WCAM formulates several grounds for resumption of these individual

191. RV art. 1013(6) (Neth.).
192. See Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; see Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12; see Vie D’Or,
supra note 12; see Randstad Holding, supra note 12; see 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong (Applicants/ Converium), supra
note 12; see Dexia Bank, supra note 12.
193. RV art. 1017(3) (Neth.).
194. MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, p. 43.
195. Id. The Shell case has demonstrated that calling in international cases can require extra attention, but
that topic does not fall within the scope of this contribution. See H.B. Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 C.J.Q. 141, 147-48
(2012) (on international notification in the Shell case and the Converium case).
196. See Rv art. 1015(1) (Neth.).
197. Id.
198. MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
199. RV art. 1015(2)(f) (Neth.).
200. MvT, TK 2011-13, 33 126, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
201. Rv art. 1015(2)(b) (Neth.).

297

05_KRANS_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2015 12:52 PM

2014 / The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages
202

proceedings. One such ground is that it irrevocably establishes that the application
203
for collective binding is not allowed.
VIII. OPTION TO OPT OUT
If the agreement is declared generally binding and that decision has become
final, all injured persons referred to in the contract are entitled to compensation
204
according to the contract. From that moment on, injured persons referred to in
the contract, who are entitled to compensation, can be considered as parties to the
205
settlement agreement. This means that the victims from that point on—
206
technically parties to the contract—can claim performance of the agreement.
However, they lose their right to instigate actions themselves against the parties
207
who committed themselves to pay compensation. To maintain the option to
208
lodge an individual claim, they must opt-out.
209
The option to opt-out is an essential element in the WCAM system. Once
the settlement agreement becomes binding on the victims referred to in the
contract, and these victims lose their right to start individual proceedings, it is
obvious that several important legal principles can be at issue, such as access to
court and the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial and independent
210
211
judge. These issues were also recognized when designing the law. It was
considered crucial that there should be an option for victims to step out of the
212
contract and to maintain their freedom to initiate individual proceedings.
Therefore, the declaration has no effect upon a person entitled to compensation,
who has notified by written communication that he does not want to be bound by
213
the contract.
As a result, once the court has granted the application, injured persons
entitled to compensation under the contract have to make up their minds: to optout and maintain the option to instigate individual proceedings or take the
compensation under the contract. Victims aiming for “the jackpot” will probably
opt-out. However, if they initiate individual proceedings, the outcome is
uncertain. They run the risk of ending up empty-handed. It seems logical to

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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See BW arts. 7:907(1), 7:908(2) (Neth.).
RV art. 1015(2)(c) (Neth.).
BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.).
Id. at art. 7:908(1).
See id.
See id.
Id. at art. 7:908(2).
MvT, TK 2003-04, 29 414, no. 3, pp. 30.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 3.
BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.).
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suppose that parties who committed themselves to provide compensation under
the contract will not easily surrender in individual proceedings after an opt-out
procedure. Injured parties who do not wish to handle their own cases will
probably prefer “to stay in the contract” and maintain their right to their
contractual claims. Compared to initiating individual proceedings, the contractual
claim requires less effort and is a relatively easy road for individual victims to
follow. On the other hand, the contractual compensation will probably not be full
214
compensation, as it is the outcome of negotiations. In the Dexia case, the court
established that the settlement agreement was the outcome of negotiations in a
situation of uncertainty, and that on both sides concessions were made and
215
chances were estimated. The mere fact that the agreement does not provide full
compensation does not justify the conclusion that the contractual compensation is
216
not fair, so ruled the court. And in the Shell case, the court took the uncertainty
of the outcome of individual proceedings against Shell into account in its
217
decision on the fairness of the agreed amounts.
The period for opt-out notification must be set by the court, but cannot be
218
less than three months. In several cases so far, the court has set this term at
219
220
three months, either ex officio or on request. In the Dexia case, the court set
221
this term at six months. In the Shell case, the court underlined that the
requirement of a written notification to opt-out is “light” and that this opt-out
222
notification also can be done by email. In the Vedior case, the court ruled that a
simple written notification from the person entitled to compensation under the
223
contract that he does not want to be bound to the contract suffices. Van Mierlo
has suggested that the individual proceedings brought by victims who have used
the option to opt-out should be concentrated in a single court: the district court in
Amsterdam. If appeals were lodged for such cases, they would therefore be
224
brought before the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. This suggestion did not
225
make it into the WCAM.

214. Dexia Bank, supra note 12; see Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
215. Dexia Bank, supra note 12.
216. Id.
217. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12. In the DES case, the court ruled that the settlement agreement
was the result of negotiations. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12.
218. BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth.).
219. Foundation Centre DES, supra note 12; Vie D’Or, supra note 12.
220. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
221. Dexia Bank, supra note 12.
222. Shell Petroleum NV, supra note 12.
223. Vie D’Or, supra note 12.
224. A.I.M. van Mierlo et al., Enkele Procesrechtelijke Kanttekeningen bij Wetsvoorstel 29 414 (Wet
Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade), in HET WETSVOORSTEL COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING MASSASCHADE 11,
23, (Nederlandse Vereniging Voor Procesrecht 2005).
225. See generally Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act [WCAM 2005] (Neth.).
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IX. RECENT EU RECOMMENDATION AND COMMUNICATION
In June 2013, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation “on
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress
mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under
226
Union Law.” The Commission also published a Communication “Towards a
227
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress.” These were not the
228
first steps at European level on the path to collective redress. For example, in
229
2005 the Commission adopted a White Paper on antitrust damages actions, and
230
in 2008, it adopted a Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress. In
February 2012, the European Parliament adopted a resolution titled “Towards a
231
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress.” A more extensive
description of European attention to the topic (including a public consultation
and its outcomes) can be found in both the Recommendation and the
232
Communication of June 2013.
The purpose of the Recommendation of June 2013 is to “facilitate access to
justice, stop illegal practices[,] and enable injured parties to obtain compensation
in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under Union law,
233
while ensuring appropriate procedural safeguards to avoid abusive litigation.”
234
This Recommendation sets out a set of basic principles. The Recommendation
instructs, “[a]ll Member States should have collective redress mechanisms at
235
national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief.” And these
236
mechanisms should respect the basic principles of the Recommendation. The
Recommendation formulates several “Principles Common To Injunctive And
Compensatory Collective Redress,” such as standing to bring a collective action,
226. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for Injunctive and
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted
Under Union Law (2013/396/EU), 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60.
227. EUR. PARL. DOC. 2011/2089(INI) (2012); Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
“Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress,” COM, 401 (June 11, 2013).
228. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages for Breach of the EC
Antitrust Rules, COM, 165 (Apr. 2, 2008); see Commission of the European Communities, Towards a
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 794.
229. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for
Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 794; Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on
Damages for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, supra note 228, 165.
230. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for
Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 794.
231. EUR. PARL. DOC. 2011/2089(INI), supra note 227.
232. Id.; Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for
Collective Redress, supra note 227, at 401.
233. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013, supra note 227, at § I.
234. Id.
235. Id. at § I.2.
236. Id.
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admissibility, information on a collective redress action and funding. It also
contains “Specific Principles Relating To Injunctive Collective Redress,” on
238
expedient procedures and efficient enforcement and “Specific Principles
Relating To Compensatory Collective Redress,” on opting in, collective
alternative dispute resolution and settlements, and the prohibition of punitive
239
damages.
In a first reaction, the Dutch Minister stated (among other things) that E.U.
involvement on the field of collective redress can have added value, as far as this
240
involvement concerns trans-boundary cases. He also stated that the Netherlands
wants to know if the principles formulated in the Recommendation and the
241
Communication are also intended for cases without transboundary elements.
Lastly, the Minister stated that in the Netherlands the WCAM is based on an opt242
out mechanism to the satisfaction of all settling parties.
X. CONCLUSION
243

The WCAM was innovative for Dutch law at the time of its introduction.
Although the Act seems to have been developed with a focus on personal injury
244
cases, it has also proved effective for purely financial cases. The WCAM is not
245
based on legal approaches to enforcing the need to reach a settlement, but
246
practice has shown that the WCAM works. The first cases and WCAM’s
evaluation in 2008 clarified that the WCAM provides Dutch law with a method
247
for settling mass damages collectively. The recent introduction of the option for
a pretrial hearing may turn out to be a useful instrument that could contribute to
248
out-of-court settlement. The same can be said of the new opportunity to ask
249
pre-judicial questions of the Supreme Court.
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